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Father Doesn't Always Know Best:
Rejecting Paternalistic Expansion of the
"Direct Threat" Defense to Claims




The television series Father Knows Best did not represent an
original tenet of American pop-culture.' Indeed, parental authority
over children is a well-established principle in common law.2
Parents often control their children's behavior to protect them from
harm. This inherent paternalistic instinct is often manifest in other
relationships, such as that between teachers and students,3 pilots
and passengers,' and employers and employees In certain
circumstances, an employer's control over the work environment is
* B.B.A., Ohio University (1999); J.D., The Dickinson School of Law of The
Pennsylvania State University (Candidate 2002). The author wishes to thank
Professor Robert Rains, Christa Kirby, Karl Myers, and Ronald Richert for their
insightful feedback and suggestions for the improvement of this comment. The
author would also like to thank his family for their unfettered support and
encouragement throughout this long process.
1. Father Knows Best (CBS television broadcast, Oct. 3 1954).
2. This principle is referred to in legal circles as patria potestas. This term
denotes "the aggregate of those peculiar powers and rights which, by the civil law
of Rome, belonged to the head of a family in respect to his wife, children..., and
any more remote descendants who sprang from him through males only."
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1127 (6th ed. 1990).
3. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 348 (1985) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (stating that "teachers have a degree of familiarity with, and authority
over, their students that is unparalleled except perhaps in the relationship between
parent and child").
4. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. NLRB, 655 F.2d 932, 937 (9th Cir.
1981) (stating that a pilot has intrinsic authority to insure the safety of the airplane,
passengers, and crew).
5. The focus of this comment is on the employer-employee relationship.
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warranted, such as situations in which an employee's conduct is
intrinsically dangerous to others.6  However, an employer's
paternalistic decision to refuse to hire an applicant for an open
position, or to discharge an employee, on the ground that the
person's recognized disability might cause a direct threat to that
person's own health or safety is not within the scope of an
employer's authority pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 ("ADA" or "Act").7 Notwithstanding this limitation,
some jurisdictions are expanding the scope of the "direct threat"
defense, due in part to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's ("EEOC" or "Commission") regulation of that
provision.8
This comment analyzes whether the "direct threat" defense,
available to employers under the Americans with Disabilities Act,
applies to employees who pose a direct threat to their own health or
safety, when threats to the health or safety of other individuals in
the workplace do not exist. Part I provides an overview of the
ADA. Specifically, this includes a discussion of Congress's purpose
for enacting the ADA, the scope of the Act's authority, and the
defenses available under its provisions. This part also discusses the
"direct threat" defense. Part II describes the EEOC and includes a
discussion of the powers granted to it by Congress and an analysis
of the EEOC's regulation of the "direct threat" defense. Part III
analyzes the various methods for interpreting the meaning and
scope of the ADA. This part includes a textual analysis and a
review of the legislative history of the "direct threat" defense. Part
IV reviews case law dealing with the "direct threat" defense, both
6. See Welz v. Manzillo, 155 A. 841, 844-45 (1931) (stating that an employer is
liable for, and responsible to prevent, injuries resulting from an employee's
operation of machinery that is "intrinsically dangerous" to others and that would
obviously expose others to danger and injury).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12514 (1994). The ADA contains four subchapters.
Title I prohibits discrimination in the terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment. Id. §§ 12111-12117. Title II prohibits discrimination in the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity. Id. §§ 12131-12165. Title III prohibits
discrimination in any place of public accommodation. Id. §§ 12181-12189. Title IV
refers to miscellaneous provisions relating to Titles I through III. Id. §§ 12201-
12213. This comment analyzes discrimination under Title I.
8. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Ctrs., Inc., 213 F.3d 209, 212
n.1 (5th Cir. 2000) (maintaining that a qualified person with a disability is a person
who can perform the essential functions of the employment position without
posing a "direct threat" to the health or safety of herself or others); see also Moses
v. American Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d 446, 447 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating that an
employer may fire a disabled employee if the disability renders the employee a
"direct threat" to his own health or safety) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a)-(b) and 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(r)).
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in favor of and against its expansion. Part V discusses the proper
application of the "direct threat" defense and speculates about the
consequences of its expansion. This comment concludes that an
employer's "direct threat" defense to claims under the ADA should
retain its black letter interpretation and extend only to employees
who cause a direct threat to "other individuals in the workplace." 9
Interpretation of this provision should not be left to administrative
or judicial expansion." Only through congressional amendment
should the ADA's "direct threat" defense be expanded to include
threats to one's own health or safety when threats to others in the
workplace do not exist.
I. The Americans with Disabilities Act
Section 3 of the Americans with Disabilities Act1 prohibits
discrimination 2 against individuals with disabilities. 3 Title I, which
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b).
10. This comment addresses the "direct threat" provision using a statutory
construction analysis. As such, it need not explore every circumstance to which
the "direct threat" provision applies. Indeed, entire law review articles and
treatise sections have been devoted to the applicability of the "direct threat"
provision to specific disabilities and illnesses. See, e.g., Laura F. Rothstein,
DISABILITIES AND THE LAW § 4.12 (2d ed. 1997); Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 108A.52 (1991); see also Susan Stefan, Delusions
of Rights: Americans with Psychiatric Disabilities, Employment Discrimination and
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 52 ALA. L. REV. 271 (2000) (psychiatric
disabilities); Rebecca Trapp, Medical Examination or Objective Medical Evidence:
What Is the Correct Procedure to Determine if an Employee Infected With the HI1V
Virus Presents a Direct Threat Under the Americans With Disabilities Act-EEOC
v. Prevo's Family Market, Inc., 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1585 (1999) (HIV/AIDS);
Jeffrey A. Van Detta, "Typhoid Mary" Meets the ADA: A Case Study of the
"Direct Threat" Standard Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 22 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 849 (1999) (epilepsy and diabetes).
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
12. As in all other venues, discrimination in the employment setting can take
many forms. The ADA enumerates seven forms of discrimination in which an
employer is prohibited from engaging. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b). Pursuant to the
ADA, the term "discriminate" includes:
(1) limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant or employee in
a way that adversely affects the opportunities or status of such applicant
or employee because of the disability of such applicant or employee;
(2) participating in a contractual or other arrangement or relationship
that has the effect of subjecting a covered entity's qualified applicant or
employee with a disability to the discrimination prohibited by this title
(such relationship includes a relationship with an employment or referral
agency, labor union ... );
(3) utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration-
(A) that have the effect of discrimination on the basis of disability;
or
(B) that perpetuate the discrimination of others who are subject to
2001]
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will be the focus of this comment," prohibits discrimination with
respect to "job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or
discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and
other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.""
A. Purpose of the Act
The Americans with Disabilities Act gives civil rights
protection to individuals with disabilities similar to those provided
to individuals on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national
origin, and age.16 The ADA guarantees equal opportunities for
individuals with disabilities in matters of employment, places of
public accommodation, and other state and local government
common administrative control;
(4) excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a
qualified individual because of the known disability of an individual with
whom the qualified individual is known to have a relationship or'
association;
(5) (A) not making reasonable accommodations to the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a
disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship
on the operation of the business of such covered entity; or
(B) denying employment opportunities to a job applicant or
employee who is an otherwise qualified individual with a disability, if
such denial is based on the need of such covered entity to make
reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental impairments of
the employee or applicant;
(6) using qualification standards, employment tests or other selection
criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a
disability or a class of individuals with disabilities unless the'standard, test
or other selection criteria, as used by the covered entity, is shown to be
job-related for the position in question and is consistent with business
necessity; and
(7) failing to select and administer tests concerning employment in
the most effective manner to ensure that,..., such test results accurately
reflect the skills, aptitude, or whatever other factor of such applicant or
employee that such test purports to measure, rather than reflecting the
impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills of such employee or
applicant (except where such skills are the factors that the test purports
to measure).
Id.
13. See infra Part I.B.
14. All further mention of, and reference to, the ADA in this comment will
relate specifically to Title I, unless otherwise noted.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
16. See generally Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17
(1994) (prohibiting employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex,
and national origin); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34
(1994) (prohibiting employment discrimination against persons forty years of age
or older).
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services." The Act seeks to redress the continuing existence of
unfair and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice resulting from
stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability
of disabled persons to participate in, and contribute to, society. 8
Before passing the Act, Congress investigated the need for
legislation in the area of disabilities and supported its proposed
legislation with a list of its findings.' 9 As a result of its investigation,
Congress found that despite some improvements that society had
made regarding its treatment of individuals with disabilities,
discrimination was still particularly prevalent in areas such as the
employment environment." To help reduce or eliminate the history
17. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7), (9).
19. As a result of its investigation, Congress found that:
(1) Some forty-three million Americans have one or more physical or
mental disabilities, and this number is increasing as the population as
a whole is growing older;
(2) Historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals
with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a
serious and pervasive social problem;
(3) Discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such
critical areas as employment.... ;
(4) [I]ndividuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of
disability have often had no legal recourse to redress such
discrimination;
(5) Individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of
discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion,... over-
protective rules and policies, failure to make modifications to
existing facilities and practices, exclusionary qualification standards
and criteria.... ;
(6) [S]tudies have documented that people with disabilities, as a group,
occupy an inferior status in our society, and are severely disad-
vantaged socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally;
(7) Individuals with disabilities.., have been faced with restrictions and
limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment,
and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our
society.... ;
(8) The Nation's proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are
to assure equality of opportunity, full participation,... for such
individuals; and
(9) The continuing existence of [discrimination] denies people with
disabilities the opportunity to compete on an equal basis and to
pursue those opportunities for which our free society is justifiably
famous ....
Id. § 12101(a).
20. See id. § 12101(a)(2), (3).
20011
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of discrimination endured by individuals with disabilities,21
Congress passed the ADA.
B. Applicability of the ADA
The Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits covered
employers' from discriminating against an employee or applicant
based upon a disability, provided that the employee is a "qualified
individual with a disability., 24  Pursuant to the ADA, the term
"disability" refers to an individual who: "(A) [has] a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more or the
major life activities of such individual; (B) [has] a record of such an
impairment; or (C) [is] regarded as having such an impairment.,
25
Further, a person is a "qualified individual with a disability" if he is
disabled and can still perform the essential functions of the
employment position that he holds or for which he is applying, with
or without reasonable accommodation 26 by the employer.27 Indeed,
21. See id. § 12101 (a)(2), (4).
22. According to Section 2 of the ADA, the purpose of the Act is:
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing
discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in
enforcing the standards established in this Act on behalf of
individuals with disabilities; and
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power
to enforce the fourteenth amendment [sic] and to regulate
commerce, in order to address the major areas of discrimination
faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.
Id. § 12101(b).
23. Pursuant to the ADA, the term "employer" is used to refer to:
[A] person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or
more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar
weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such
person, except that, for two years following the effective date of this title,
an employer means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce
who has twenty-five or more employees for each working day in each of
twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year, and any
agent of such person.
Id. § 12111(5)(A).
24. See id. § 12112(a).
25. Id. § 12102(2).
26. The term "reasonable accommodation" may include, but is not limited to:
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and
usable by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassign-
ment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or
devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations,
training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or
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the employer has an obligation to provide reasonable accommo-
dations for known disabilities unless doing so would result in an
undue hardship28 to the operation of the employer's business. 29 In
order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in violation of
the ADA, an employee or applicant must prove that (1) he has a
disability; (2) he is a qualified individual; and (3) he was subjected
to unlawful discrimination because of his disability.'
Although Congress designed the ADA to protect individuals
with disabilities, Title I does not require employers to hire all
disabled persons, regardless of their disability.3" If an employee or
potential employee is disabled but is not a "qualified individual
with a disability," the employer has no obligation to make
reasonable accommodations for that person with respect to job
application procedures, the hiring, advancement or discharge of the
employee, compensation, job training, or other terms, conditions
and privileges of employment.32 In addition, an employer may
lawfully decide that certain physical characteristics or medical
interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with
disabilities.
Id. § 12111(9).
27. Id. § 12111(8).
28. In general, an action would cause an "undue hardship" to an employer if it
required significant difficulty or expense, when considered in light of certain
factors. Id. § 12111(10)(B). In determining whether an accommodation would
impose an undue hardship on a covered entity, factors to be considered include,
but are not limited to:
(1) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this Act;
(2) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in
the provision of the reasonable accommodation; the number of
persons employed at such facility; the effect on expenses and
resources, or the impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the
operation of the facility;
(3) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size
of the business of a covered entity with respect to the number of its
employees; the number, type, and location of its facilities; and
(4) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including
the composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of such
entity; the geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal
relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the covered
entity.
Id.
29. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
30. See id. § 12102(2); see also Morisky v. Broward County, 80 F.3d 445, 447
(11th Cir. 1996) (citing Tyndall v. National Educ. Ctrs., 31 F.3d 209, 212 (4th Cir.
1994)).




conditions are more preferable than others and that limiting
impairments make certain individuals less ideally suited for a job.33
Because the ADA seeks to balance the legitimate interests of
both the disabled and employers, it does not give free reign to
qualified individuals with disabilities.34 An employer may not be
held to have violated the ADA if he imposes a valid qualification
standard, test, or other selection criteria.35 An employer is limited,
however, in his denial of employment to a disabled person who
does not meet the established qualification standards.36 Pursuant to
the ADA, an employer may only screen out an individual with a
disability using a qualification standard when the standard is shown
to be job-related for the position in question and is consistent with
business necessity.37 If an individual does not meet a qualification
standard due to a risk imposed by a disability, then the employer
has a duty to determine whether a reasonable accommodation
would either eliminate the risk or reduce it to an acceptable level. 8
If no accommodation exists that would either eliminate or reduce
the risk, then the employer may legally refuse to hire an applicant
or discharge an employee who does not meet the qualification
standard.39
C. Direct Threat Defense
One of an employer's available defenses to claims brought
under the ADA is that a qualification standard may include a
requirement that "an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the
health or safety of other individuals in the workplace."4 In other
words, the ADA may permit an employer to exclude an otherwise
33. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475-77 (1999) (affirming
an employer's decision to terminate the interviews of, and deny employment to,
two job applicants because they did not meet the employer's minimum vision
requirements).
34. See generally, 42 U.S.C. § 12113.
35. Id. § 12113(a).
36. See id. The EEOC's regulations implementing Title I define "qualification
standards" to mean "the personal and professional attributes including the skill,
experience, education, physical, medical, safety and other requirements
established by a covered entity as requirements which an individual must meet in
order to be eligible for the position held or desired." Albertsons, Inc. v.
Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 568 n.14 (1998) (citation omitted).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6).
38. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(r) (1998).
39. See id.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (emphasis added).
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qualified individual if that individual poses a direct threat to other
employees or customers in the workplace.41
However, an employer's authority to deny employment under
the "direct threat" provision is not unlimited. An employer is not
permitted to deny an employment opportunity to an individual with
a disability merely because of a "slightly increased risk."43 The risk
may only be included as a qualification standard when it poses a
"significant risk"' of substantial harm. A speculative or remote
risk is insufficient to warrant excluding from employment a
qualified individual with a disability. '  Determining whether an
individual poses a significant risk of substantial harm to others must
be made on a case-by-case basis and may include factors such as (1)
the nature of the risk, (2) the nature and severity of the potential
harm, (3) the likelihood that the potential harm will occur, and (4)
the imminence of the potential harm. 7
On its face, the "direct threat" defense only applies when a
disabled individual poses a direct threat to other individuals in the
workplace." However, interpretation of this provision is now being
expanded to include threats to the disabled person when threats to
other individuals in the workplace do not exist. 9
41. See id.; see also infra note 151.
42. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(r).
43. See id; cf. Hamlin v. Charter Township of Flint, 165 F.3d 426, 432 (6th Cir.
1999) (stating that an employer's reliance upon its own subjective perceptions does
not establish as a matter of law that an employee's physical limitations caused a
high probability of potential harm).
44. A "significant risk" means a high probability. See 29 C.F.R. app. §
1630.2(r).
45. See id; cf. Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1422 (9th Cir. 1985)
(pursuant to Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the court stated that an
elevated risk of injury, without more, is insufficient to justify the refusal to hire an
otherwise qualified handicapped person; rather, there must be a showing of a
reasonable probability of substantial harm).
46. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 56-57 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 338-339 (citing School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273
(1987)); see also Dipol v. New York Transit Auth., 999 F. Supp 309, 316 (E.D.N.Y.
1998) (citing 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(r)) (stating that speculative conclusions and the
mere possibility that there may be future manifestations of symptoms of diabetes
do not constitute sufficient evidence to prove that employees will cause a direct
threat to co-workers); EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., 917 F. Supp. 1164, 1170 (E.D.
Mich. 1996) (citing 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(r)) (stating that evidence of three blood sugar
tests is purely speculative and is therefore insufficient to prove that employee's
diabetes would cause a direct threat to co-workers).
47. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r), followed by Hindman v. GTE Data Serv., Inc.,
No. 93-1046-CIV-T-17C, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9522, at *14-*16 (M.D. Fla. June
24, 1994).
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b).
49. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(r).
2001]
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II. The United States Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission
The United States Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission is the main proponent of the "direct threat"
provision's expansion." This section describes the EEOC and
examines the scope of the agency's regulation of this provision.
A. What is the EEOC?
The United States Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission is a federal agency established to enforce the principal
federal statutes prohibiting employment discrimination." Among
the statutes that fall within the EEOC's jurisdiction52 is the
Americans with Disabilities Act, which prohibits employment
discrimination on the basis of disability in both the public and
private sectors.53 The EEOC believes that it is essential to issue
interpretive guidance to supplement the original discrimination
statutes to ensure that affected individuals understand their rights
and to encourage and facilitate compliance by covered entities. 4
Congress created the EEOC to effectuate the purpose and
policies behind Title 42 of the United States Code.5 When it
enacted the ADA, Congress extended the EEOC's power to
include issuing regulations to carry out the provisions of the Act.56
Pursuant to that power, Congress entrusted the EEOC with
formulating statements of general policy and interpretations of
50. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission: An Overview, at
http://www.eeoc.gov/overview.html (last modified November 3, 1997).
51. Id.
52. Other statutes that fall within the EEOC's jurisdiction include: Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17 (1994) (as amended, prohibits
employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-
34 (1994) (as amended, prohibits employment discrimination against individuals
forty years of age and older); the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1994) (prohibits
discrimination on the basis of gender in compensation for substantially similar
work under similar conditions); Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§
701-94 (1994) (as amended, prohibits employment discrimination against federal
employees with disabilities).
53. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission: An Overview, at
http://www.eeoc.gov/overview.html (last modified November 3, 1997).
54. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.
55. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a), (g) (1994).
56. See id. § 12116. In carrying out the provisions of the ADA, the EEOC
must do so in accordance with subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5 of United States
Code. See 5 U.S.C. § 551. (1994).
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future legislation, including the ADA.57 Section 106 of the ADA
requires that the EEOC issue substantive regulations implementing
Title I of the Act. 8 It is with this power that the EEOC developed
its definition of the "direct threat" provision.
B. EEOC's Regulation of the "Direct Threat" Defense
The EEOC's regulation of the ADA defines a direct threat as
"a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the
individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reason-
able accommodation." 9 Compared to the language contained in
the statute, the EEOC's regulation differs by its inclusion of the
disabled individual himself within the scope of the "direct threat"
defense.60 This addition does not merely interpret the meaning of
the ADA; it changes the scope of the Act by including a new and
distinct classification of people within its reach. This legislative
maneuvering exceeds the EEOC's congressionally delegated power
to implement Title I of the ADA.61
The determination of whether an individual poses a direct
threat, according to the EEOC, is made on a case-by-case, ad hoc
basis.62 This individualized assessment must be based on a reason-
able medical judgment that relies on (1) the most current medical
knowledge, and/or (2) the best available objective evidence.6 The
EEOC has also enumerated certain factors that may be considered
when determining whether an individual poses a direct threat,
including the duration of the risk, the nature and severity of the
potential harm, the likelihood that the potential harm will occur,
and the imminence of the potential harm.64
Having established a basic understanding of the "direct threat"
defense and the EEOC's expansion of its scope, this comment will
now discuss the proper meaning and interpretation of that
provision. As the following sections illustrate, the "direct threat"
defense should not be expanded beyond Congress's express
language.
57. See 5 U.S.C. § 552.
58. See id.
59. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (emphasis added).
60. See id.
61. See id. § 1630.1(a).
62. See id. § 1630.2(r).
63. Id.
64. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(r)(1) to (4).
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III. Interpretation of the "Direct Threat" Defense
To determine the meaning of the direct threat defense, this
section first explores the text of the provision to discover that the
language expresses Congress's clear and unambiguous intent. It
then applies the "direct threat" defense under the Chevron doctrine
by analyzing the legislative history of the provision to determine
whether the EEOC's interpretation is based on a reasonable
construction.
A. Textual Analysis
In order to resolve the question concerning the scope of the
"direct threat" defense, the language of the provision itself provides
some clarification.65 The "direct threat" defense permits employers
to impose a "requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct
threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the
workplace." 66 On its face, the language in this section does not
include direct threats to the health or safety of the disabled
individual himself.67 Furthermore, by expressly including only
threats to "other individuals in the workplace," the statutory
language makes clear that Congress did not intend to include the
disabled individual himself within the scope of the defense.'
Congress's findings regarding individuals with disabilities also
lend support to the conclusion that Congress did not intend to
expand the "direct threat" provision to include threats to a disabled
employee himself.69 Among its enumerated findings, Congress
stated that individuals with disabilities continually encounter
various forms of discrimination, specifically including over-
protective rules and policies.7" Coupled with the lack of an express
provision extending the "direct threat" defense to individuals who
pose a threat to themselves, Congress's intent to eliminate over-
protective rules and policies regarding individuals with disabilities is
65. See, e.g., Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Bureau of Labor and Indus., 859 P.2d
1143, 1146 (1993) (stating that the text of the statutory provision itself is the
starting point for interpretation and is the best evidence of the legislature's intent).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (emphasis added).
67. See id.
68. See Echazabal v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 226 F.3d 1063, 1066-67 (9th Cir.
2000), cert. granted, 70 U.S.L.W. 3314 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2001) (No. 00-1406).
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. This is a maxim of statutory interpretation
meaning that the expression or mention of one thing implies the exclusion of
another. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 581 (6th ed. 1990).
69. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5).
70. See id.
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evidence that Congress designed the ADA to limit the scope of the
"direct threat" defense.
Notwithstanding this textual analysis, it is at best negligent to
find in congressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule
of law." For this reason, other methods of statutory analysis must
be explored.
B. Statutory Interpretation Under Chevron
In the landmark case of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council,72 the United States Supreme Court
established guidelines for statutory interpretation.73 In Chevron,
the Supreme Court reversed the District of Columbia Circuit's
definition of a provision in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977
when it decided that Congress itself had not explicitly commanded
that definition.74 The Supreme Court indicated that once the D.C.
Circuit determined that Congress had not expressed its intent with
respect to the applicability of that provision, the question before
the court was not whether it thought the applicability of the
provision was appropriate, but rather, whether the agency's
application of the provision was reasonable. In deciding whether
the D.C. Circuit's legal error resulted in an erroneous judgment on
the validity of the provision, the Supreme Court established a
standard by which all legislation should be interpreted by the
courts.7 6
The Supreme Court explained that when a court reviews an
agency's construction of a statute, the court is confronted with two
questions.77 The first of these questions always is whether Congress
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.8 If Congress's
intent is clear, the statute or provision in question needs no further
analysis; a reviewing court, as well as an agency, must give effect to
Congress's unambiguously expressed intent." If, however, the
court determines that Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue, the court cannot simply impose its own
construction of the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of
71. See Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946).
72. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
73. See generally id.
74. Id. at 842.
75. Id. at 845.
76. See id. at 842.
77. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
7& Id.
79. Id. at 842-43.
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an administrative interpretation.80 Rather, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue or definition of a term,
the question for the court is whether the agency's interpretation of
the issue is based on a permissible construction of the statute.8
Further, considerable weight is accorded to that construction when
the agency is entrusted to administer the statutory scheme.82
The principle of deference to administrative interpretations
"has been consistently followed by [the Supreme Court] whenever
[a] decision as to the meaning or reach of a statute has involved
reconciling conflicting policies." 83 Deference has also been given to
an agency where a full understanding of the force of the statutory
policy in a certain situation has depended upon more than ordinary
knowledge respecting the matters subjected to agency regulations.'
Following the two-part Chevron test, it seems that applying the
"direct threat" provision of the ADA to disabled individuals them-
selves fails at both ends. First, express statutory language shows
that Congress intended the "direct threat" defense to apply only to
other individuals in the workplace." Second, even if the
congressional intent is ambiguous, the EEOC has exceeded its
authority by expanding the scope of the "direct threat" defense
beyond its congressional power to regulate under the ADA.' A
detailed application of the Chevron doctrine is discussed later in
this comment.'
IV. Judicial Response to Interpretation of the ADA
Although the text, legislative history, and congressional intent
of the ADA make clear that the scope of the "direct threat"
provision does not extend to disabled persons themselves, a proper
analysis requires a consideration of judicial interpretation both
supporting and rejecting the EEOC's expansion. Notably, few
courts have addressed the narrow issue of whether the "direct
threat" provision includes threats to oneself when threats to others
do not exist. Many courts have addressed whether the provision
80. Id. at 843.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 844.
83. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844-45 (citing National Broad. Co., Inc. v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943); NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944);
Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945)).
84. See id. at 843.
85. See infra Part V.
86. See infra Part V.
87. See infra Part V.
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applies to direct threats both to oneself and to others, but only the
Ninth and Eleventh Circuits and a few district courts have
specifically addressed the narrow issue that this comment
addresses.
A. Case Law Following the EEOC Regulation
The following cases used the EEOC's regulation of the "direct
threat" provision in their analyses. While one case addressed a
threat to an individual employee alone, the courts' analyses in the
other cases referred to potential threats to both the individual and
others in the workplace. Regardless of the specific circumstances of
each case, the courts applied the EEOC's standard.
In the case of Moses v. American Nonwovens, Inc.,' Moses, an
epileptic employee, brought a claim against his employer alleging
that it fired him in violation of the ADA.89 In its opinion, the Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit relied on the EEOC's
regulation of the "direct threat" provision, stating that an employer
may fire an employee if the disability renders the employee a direct
threat to his own health or safety.' The court found that the
employee's uncontrolled seizures made him a direct threat to
himself, because his assigned tasks all involved working in close
proximity to dangerous equipment.9" Because Moses presented no
evidence that he was not a direct threat or that any reasonable
accommodation could be made, the court affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer.9
Another Eleventh Circuit case arrived at the same conclusion
based on similar facts.93 In LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc.,
LaChance, a line cook at the defendant's restaurant, had a history
of complex partial seizures with secondary generalization. 9 The
defendant discharged LaChance following two episodes during
working hours.95 In his deposition, LaChance's supervisor testified
that line cooks were required to cook on a gas flat top grill, use a
88. 97 F.3d 446 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1118 (1997).
89. Id. at 447.
90. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a)-(b) and 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r)).
91. Id. at 447-48. As a product inspector, the employee sat on a platform
above fast-moving press rollers; as a web operator, he sat underneath a conveyor
belt with in-running pinch-points; as hot splicer assistant, he worked next to
exposed machinery that reached temperatures of 350 degrees Fahrenheit. Id.
92. Id. at 448.
93. See LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832 (11th Cir. 1998).




"fryolater" filled with hot grease, and use slicing machines. 96 The
defendant also provided testimony that a person with the kind of
seizures LaChance experienced should be restricted from working
with such machines and that LaChance posed a risk to himself and
to others while working around those appliances."' As in the Moses
case, the court found that LaChance failed to produce probative
evidence that he was not a direct threat or that the employer could
have provided a reasonable accommodation for his disability. 98 As
a result, the court upheld the district court's grant of summary
judgment for the employer.9
The Fifth Circuit applies a similar standard to that of the
Eleventh Circuit.1° In Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Centers,
Inc., the defendant employed Rizzo, a hearing impaired individual,
as a teacher's aide.1 ' As part of her employment duties, Rizzo
drove a van that transported children to and from school. 2
Expressing concern for the employee's ability to safely operate the
van and supervise the children in the van at the same time, the
employer relieved Rizzo of her driving duties. 3 The court's deter-
mination in favor of the employee ultimately turned on evidence
that she could operate the van safely without causing a direct threat
to the passengers."°  The court did not evaluate whether Rizzo
caused a direct threat to herself.' Nevertheless, the court applied
the EEOC's standard, which included an analysis of potential
threats both to the children and to the employee herself.'O° The
court stated, "whether one is a direct threat [to the safety of herself
or others] is a complicated, fact intensive determination. ..."'07
While these cases present somewhat of an anomaly from the
thesis of this comment, 1" they demonstrate that two circuits have
96. Id. at 834.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 836.
99. Id. at 836.
100. See Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Ctrs., Inc., 213 F.3d 209 (5th Cir.
2000).




105. Id. at 211.
106. Id.
107. Id. (alteration in original) (citing Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Ctrs.,
Inc., 84 F.3d 758 (5th Cir. 1996) (Rizzo I)).
108. Ultimately, the holdings of these cases were based on the lack of evidence
that a reasonable accommodation could be made or the lack of evidence showing a
direct threat to other individuals, rather than on a showing of direct threats to the
individuals themselves. See sources cited supra notes 88-107.
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implicitly endorsed the EEOC's expansion of the "direct threat"
provision. Although only one of the cases provided an opportunity
for the Eleventh Circuit to apply the EEOC's regulation to an
employee alone, the expansion of the "direct threat" defense
remains a concern. The rule of law upon which those courts relied,
in the cases involving threats to both the employee and others, may
soon manifest itself in other opinions involving threats to the
employee alone.
B. Case Law Challenging the EEOC Guidelines
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and some district courts
use a different application of the "direct threat" defense than that
of the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits. As the following cases
demonstrate, these courts did not follow the EEOC's regulation,
but instead used more of a strict construction of the "direct threat"
provision.
In Echazabal v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,1°9 the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit addressed the scope of the "direct threat"
defense by considering whether the provision applies to employees,
or prospective employees, who pose a direct threat to their own
health or safety, but not to the health or safety of other individuals
in the workplace."' In 1992, Echazabal applied for a job at an oil
refinery where he had worked for over twenty years as an employee
of various maintenance contractors.."' The oil refinery offered
Echazabal a position, on the condition that he pass a physical
examination.12 Based on the results of the examination, the
refinery determined that Echazabal's liver was releasing enzymes at
a level higher than normal and concluded that exposure to the
solvents and chemicals present at the refinery might damage his
liver."' As a result, the refinery rescinded its job offer."' Following
the examination, Echazabal consulted several doctors, and despite
diagnosing him with asymptomatic, chronic active hepatitis C, none
of the doctors advised Echazabal that he should stop working at the
refinery because of his medical condition. "5 Echazabal continued
working at the oil refinery through a maintenance contractor, and
109. 226 F.3d 1063, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 70 U.S.L.W. 3314
(U.S. Oct. 29, 2001) (No. 00-1406).
110. See id. at 1064.







then re-applied for a position several years later."6 Again, the oil
refinery offered him a position contingent upon his passing a
physical examination but eventually rescinded its offer for fear that
Echazabal would suffer liver damage if he worked at the refinery."'
Unlike the previous time however, the oil refinery prohibited
Echazabal from working on the premises with any contractor.
8
Echazabal filed a complaint with the EEOC and brought a
state court action against the oil refinery. 19 The refinery removed
the action to federal court, and the district court entered summary
judgment in favor of the oil refinery.2 However, the court of
appeals reversed 2' and held that the ADA's "direct threat" defense
is not applicable to disabled individuals who only pose a direct
threat to themselves. 22
In its reasoning, the court of appeals first adhered to the plain
meaning of the ADA's language.'23 In light of the text of the Act
and its legislative history, the court of appeals determined that the
EEOC's interpretation of the "direct threat" provision is contrary
to the intended meaning of the ADA. 124 Next, the court rejected
the oil refinery's claim that performing the work at the refinery
without posing a direct threat to one's own health or safety is an
"essential function" of the job."n Further, the court acknowledged
that according to the Act, a "qualified individual with a disability"
is an individual who, "with or without reasonable accommodation,
can perform the essential functions of the employment position.'
26
The court of appeals declared that an employer may not turn every
condition of employment into a job function, let alone an essential




119. Echazabal, 226 F.3d at 1065.
120. Id.
121. Dissenting, Judge Trott would have affirmed the district court's holding.
See Echazabal, 226 F.3d at 1075 (Trott, J., dissenting). Judge Trott believed that
Echazabal was not "otherwise qualified" for the position, because he could not
perform the essential functions of the position. Id. at 1073 (Trott, J., dissenting).
Trott reasoned that because of Echazabal's disability, the essential functions at
issue might have killed him. Id. at 1073-74 (Trott, J., dissenting). Further, Judge
Trott asserted that the oil refinery was entitled to use the "direct threat" defense,
citing other circuits that had addressed the issue. Id. at 1074 (Trott, J., dissenting).
122. Echazabal, 226 F.3d at 1072.
123. See id. at 1065-70.
124. See id. at 1069-70.
125. See id. at 1070.
126. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (emphasis added).
127. See Echazabal, 226 F.3d at 1071.
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court stated, "[the oil refinery's] reading of 'essential functions'
would, by definitional slight-of-hand, circumvent Congress's
decision to exclude a paternalistic risk-to-self defense in circum-
stances in which an employee's disability does not prevent him from
performing the requisite work."'28
While the Ninth Circuit is the only court of appeals to reject
the expansion of the "direct threat" provision, several district courts
have also refused to endorse the EEOC's regulation. For example,
in Kohnke v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,'129 Kohnke, a baggage customer
service agent, alleged employment discrimination in violation of the
ADA.30 Kohnke filed a motion to reconsider a magistrate judge's
ruling that any "direct threat" jury instruction should refer to a
direct threat to others or the employee, rather than to others only. 3'
The district court granted the motion to reconsider the ruling and
concluded that any "direct threat" jury instruction should refer to a
direct threat to others and not to the employee himself.'32
After considering the statute's plain language, legislative
history, and relevant case law, the district court stated that the
EEOC's interpretation of the direct threat language in the ADA
was "untenable."' 3 First, the court noted that the ADA clearly and
unambiguously refers to "a direct threat to the health or safety of
other individuals in the workplace," and not to the individual
himself.34 Second, the House Judiciary Report on the ADA
mentions a threat or risk "to other individuals" or "to others"
numerous times, without once mentioning a threat or risk to the
disabled person himself.' Finally, the court found almost no case
law specifically dealing with the difference between the language of
128. Id. at 1071. While the Ninth Circuit's decision in Echazabal preserves the
right of disabled employees to make employment decisions that affect their own
health or safety, the ruling also raises several policy concerns. Although this
comment is limited to a statutory construction analysis, several law review articles
address the policy considerations behind the "direct threat" provision. See, e.g.,
Katelyn S. Oldham, The Implications of Echazabal v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. for
Employers and for the Administration of Workers' Compensation and the
Occupational Safety and Health Act, 80 OR. L. REV. 327 (2001). In her comment,
Oldham states, "[The Echazabal decision] conflicts with provisions of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), may lead to increased
workers' compensation premiums and confusion in claims administration, and
exposes employers to limited tort liability." Id. at 327-28.
129. 932 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
130. Id. at 1113.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Kohnke, 932 F. Supp. at 1111.
134. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (emphasis added)).
135. Id. at 1112 (citation omitted).
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the ADA and the EEOC's regulation, and the only similar case it
found was an unpublished opinion that it deemed to have little
precedential value.'36
V. Analysis
The divergent views of the circuit courts demonstrate the
complexity of employment related issues such as the "direct threat"
defense.137 This comment has addressed the text of the ADA, its
legislative history, Congress's intent with respect to the Act, and
judicial response to the EEOC's regulation of the Act. An analysis
of these elements will help lead to the conclusion that the provision
should not be expanded to include threats to the disabled individual
when threats to others do not exist. This section evaluates the
issues addressed throughout this comment.
The "direct threat" provision of the ADA permits employers
to impose a "requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct
threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the
workplace."'38  The EEOC has expanded this provision to mean
that an individual will not pose a direct threat to "the individual or
others."13 9 If the ADA merely referred to direct threats to health or
safety "in the workplace," then the EEOC's interpretation would
seem permissible. However, the ADA clearly and unambiguously
limits the provision to "other individuals" in the workplace. The
EEOC's expansion must be rejected given the generally accepted
rule of statutory construction that words of common usage be given
their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning.' 4° Further, the EEOC
should not construe a statute in a way that makes words or phrases
meaningless, redundant, or superfluous.1 4 ' The EEOC's regulation
renders meaningless the phrase "other individuals" by including the
disabled individual himself within the provision's reach. The
136. Id. at 1113.
137. In his dissenting opinion in Echazabal v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., Judge Trott
noted the "fortunate" conflict that arose between the Ninth Circuit in that case
and the Eleventh Circuit in Moses v. American Nonwovens, Inc. Echazabal, 226
F.3d at 1075 (Trott, J., dissenting). According to Judge Trott, the conflict is
"fortunate[] because [it] will compel the Supreme Court-or Congress-to resolve
this dispute...." Id.
138. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (emphasis added).
139. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(r).
140. See State v. Langley, 839 P.2d 692, 698 (1992) (citing Perez v. State Farm
Mut. Ins. Co., 613 P.2d 32, 34 (1980).
141. Cf. Zimmerman v. North Am. Signal Co., 704 F.2d 347, 353 (7th Cir. 1983)
(citations omitted) (stating the general rule that courts, as opposed to agencies,
should not construe a statute beyond its intended meaning).
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EEOC's interpretation must be rejected for this reason. Indeed,
another portion of the EEOC's regulation under the ADA has
been previously rejected, '42 and the canons of statutory construction
dictate that courts do so now.
Because Congress's language in the "direct threat" provision of
the ADA is clear and unambiguous, no further analysis is needed.'43
Still, even if the statutory language were not clear, the EEOC's
interpretation fails under the United States Supreme Court's test in
Chevron.'" Under Chevron, when a statute is silent or ambiguous,
and a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute, the
court must first determine whether Congress's intent is clear.' 5 If it
is not, the court must then determine whether the agency's
interpretation is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.'" As this comment explains, the EEOC's interpretation of
the "direct threat" provision fails both prongs of the Chevron
analysis.
The legislative history of the ADA supports the conclusion
that Congress did not intend for the "direct threat" provision to
include threats to oneself when a threat to others does not exist.47
The term "direct threat" appears dozens of times throughout the
ADA's legislative history-in the final conference report, in various
House and Senate committee reports, and in hearings and floor
debates." In nearly every instance in which it appears, the term is
followed by a reference to a significant risk to "others" or "other
individuals in the workplace.' ' 4' Not once is the term accompanied
by a reference to threats to the disabled person himself."'
142. See Coghlan v. H.J. Heinz Co., 851 F. Supp. 808, 813 (N.D. Tex. 1994)
(rejecting the EEOC's interpretation of "substantially limits" within the definition
of "disability" under the ADA because the court found it to be "directly at odds
with clear statutory language").
143. See, e.g., Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 162 (1991) (stating that a court
need not refer to a statute's legislative history where statutory language is
unambiguous); United States v. Hudspeth, 42 F.3d 1015, 1022 (7th Cir. 1994) (en
banc) (stating that a court should turn to the legislative history to interpret a
statute only when the statute is ambiguous), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1105 (1995).
144. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-
44 (1984); see also discussion supra Part III.B.
145. Id. at 482.
146. Id. at 483.
147. See, e.g., H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-596, at 57, 60, 77, 84 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 566, 569, 586, 593.
14& See, e.g., H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-596, at 57, 60, 77, 84, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 566, 569, 586, 593.
149. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-596, at 57, 60, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 566, 569.
150. See Echazabal v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 226 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2000),
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Moreover, Senator Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts, a co-
sponsor of the ADA, strongly reinforced this limitation on
Congress's intent through his comments in the Congressional
Record."' Senator Kennedy emphasized the importance of having
the ADA specifically refer only to the health and safety of others.1
2
He warned that Congress did not design the Act to allow employers
to deny employment based upon paternalistic concerns about a
person's safety that should rightfully be left to that individual. 5
The Congressional Record also likens the ADA to other anti-
discrimination legislation."' In recounting the long history of
tolerance that Americans have had for discrimination against
disabled persons, and the way in which we have historically
succumbed to irrational fear and prejudice, Senator Kennedy
stated, "[O]ur paternalistic approach did no more to improve the
lives of people with disabilities than labor laws restricting women in
the workplace did to protect women."'55  Kennedy's analogy is
clear. Allowing an employer to determine whether an employee or
potential employee is physically or mentally suited for a position
would allow the employer's own prejudices and preconceptions to
blur its perception of the employee's true qualifications.
cert. granted, 70 U.S.L.W. 3314 (U.S. Oct. 29, 2001) (No. 00-1406).
151. See id. at 1067-68 (citing 136 CONG. REC. S9684-03, at S9697 (1990)
(statement of Sen. Kennedy)). Kennedy stated,
The ADA provides that a valid qualification standard is that a person not
pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the
workplace-that is, to other coworkers or customers .... It is important,
however, that the ADA specifically refers to health and safety threats to
others. Under the ADA, employers may not deny a person an
employment opportunity based on paternalistic concerns regarding the
person's health. For example, an employer could not use as an excuse for
not hiring a person with HIV disease the claim that the employer was
simply "protecting the individual" from opportunistic diseases to which
the individual might be exposed. That is a concern that should rightfully




154. See generally 136 CONG. REC. S9680 (1990).
155. Id. Senator Kennedy's analogy was previously addressed by the United
State Supreme Court when it said, "[T]he argument that a particular job is too
dangerous for women may appropriately be met by the rejoinder that it is the
purpose of Title VII to allow the individual woman to make that choice for
herself." Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335 (1977); accord UAW v. Johnson
Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 202 (1991) (the Court held that Title VII bars
employers from excluding fertile females from jobs entailing a risk of harm to
fetuses and stated that fetal safety is a determination best left to the mother).
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Further, the EEOC met opposition in 1991, when it published
a notice of proposed rulemaking ("NPRM") for Title I of the ADA
as it pertained to employment.'5 6 To assist the EEOC in developing
its ADA regulations, the Commission requested comments from
disability rights organizations, employers, unions, state agencies,
and interested individuals. '57 Many of the groups responded to the
NPRM by asserting that the definition of "direct threat" should not
include a reference to the health or safety of the individual with a
disability.18 They expressed concern that the inclusion of "risk to
self" in the definition would result in direct threat determinations
that are based on negative stereotypes and paternalistic views about
what is best for individuals with disabilities.5 9 Notwithstanding this
opposition, the EEOC retained in the final regulation the reference
to the health or safety of the individual with a disability.'
60
A final insight into the congressional intent behind passing the
ADA lies in the Act's judicial history. The House Judiciary
Committee Report expressed its intention that the "direct threat"
provision should codify the standard applied under the Rehabil-
itation Act16 by the Supreme Court in School Board of Nassau
County v. Arline.'62 In Arline, an elementary school discharged a
teacher after the teacher suffered a third relapse of tuberculosis
within two years.' 63 The Court ultimately remanded the case for
further findings of the contiguousness to determine whether the
teacher posed a significant risk of communicating her disease to
others in the workplace.'" Because Congress attempted to codify
the Supreme Court's rule in Arline when it enacted the "direct
threat" provision, it seems clear that the interpretation of that
156. See Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals With Disabilities, 56
Fed. Reg. 35,726, 35,730 (July 26, 1991) (describing Section 1630.2(r) in its Section-
by-Section Analysis of Comments and Revisions).
157. Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals With Disabilities, 56 Fed.
Reg. 8578, 8579 (proposed Feb. 28, 1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630).
158. Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals With Disabilities, 56 Fed.
Reg. at 35,730.
159. Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals With Disabilities, 56 Fed.
Reg. at 35,730.
160. Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals With Disabilities, 56 Fed.
Reg. at 35,730 (the EEOC justified its final regulation by citing its consistency with
the legislative history of the ADA and the case law interpreting section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act).
161. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973).
162. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-485, at 34, 45 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 457,468 (citing School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S!
273 (1987)).
163. Arline, 480 U.S. at 276.
164. Id. at 289.
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provision should follow the rule of that case. In other words, by
citing Arline as its model for the "direct threat" defense, Congress
intended to apply the provision only as far as the rule in Arline
extended-to risks to "others in the workplace."
Even though the "direct threat" provision is unambiguous, and
even though Congress's intent in passing the ADA is clear,
continuing the Chevron analysis indicates that the EEOC's
expansion was not based on a permissible construction of the Act.
In most circumstances, the EEOC has interpreted the ADA only by
defining provisions of the Act that Congress did not explicitly
define.' For example, the definitions of "disability" in Section 2
and "employee" and "employer" in Title I of the ADA are each
identical to the definitions of those terms in the EEOC's regulation
of the Act.166
Conversely, the EEOC's definition of "direct threat" varies in
a number of ways from the language of the ADA, most notably in
the inclusion of the disabled individual himself.67 The EEOC
defined a direct threat as "a significant risk of substantial harm to
the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be
eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation."' 168 The
inclusion of "substantial harm" and "reduced" does not alter the
meaning of Congress's language in the ADA. Rather, the inclusion
of such language manifests the EEOC's power to interpret the
meaning of otherwise ambiguous or unclear language in the Act. 69
Certainly, "substantial harm" defines what Congress meant by a
"significant risk," and "reduced" enhances the purpose for which
Congress included "eliminated by reasonable accommodation."
However, while some of these differences in language
effectuate the power that Congress entrusted to the EEOC to
interpret and clarify the language of the Act or to further its
purpose, including the disabled individual within the reach of the
"direct threat" provision alters the very nature of the Act. 70 This
expansion runs counter to the familiar and well settled canon that
plain and unambiguous statutory language admits of no inter-
pretation or construction to explain or extend its meaning and must
165. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2.
166. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12102, and § 12111, with 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2.
167. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3), with 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r).
168. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (emphasis added).
169. See 5 U.S.C. § 552.
170. Indeed, the disabled person himself represents an entire classification of
people whole and separate from "other individuals in the workplace."
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be applied as written.'71 When enacting legislation, Congress is
presumed to use words in their plain meaning, as interpreted by a
reasonable person, unless it indicates to the contrary." Here,
Congress has not so indicated. The unambiguous statutory
language in the ADA, read in its common and generally
understood sense, plainly does not include the disabled person
himself. Including the disabled individual within the language of
the Act's regulation adds an entirely new classification of people
within its statutory scope. Instead of protecting only "other
individuals in the workplace," the EEOC has incorporated disabled
persons as well-a class that Congress did not intend to include in
the provision. Therefore, the EEOC has exceeded its congressional
power, and its regulation of the provision is not based on a
permissible construction.
Conclusion
Prior to Congress's passage of the ADA, society's accumulated
myths and fears about disabilities were as handicapping to disabled
employees as were the physical limitations that flowed from
impairment. Allowing an employer to discriminate against
individuals with disabilities by categorically excluding them from
coverage under the ADA would repudiate the very purpose behind
the Act. The "direct threat" provision replaces such irrational
justification for discrimination with a mandate that employers find
concrete, non-speculative evidence of a direct threat to other
individuals in the workplace. Paternalistic decisions by employers
are nothing more than a form of discrimination that Congress
designed the ADA to prevent. Expanding the "direct threat"
provision not only perpetuates this form of paternalistic discrim-
ination, but it also does not constitute a permissible construction of
the ADA.
The Ninth Circuit adopted the proper approach to applying the
"direct threat" provision of the ADA when it decided Echazabal v.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. Regulation of the "direct threat" defense
should retain its literal meaning-that the provision does not
include direct threats to oneself when a threat to others does not
exist. Courts should not allow an employer to impose its judgment
where a disabled employee is capable of ascertaining his own
safety, recognizing that "father" does not always know best.
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